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OLC 69-0662

31 July 1969

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Briefing by Mr. Duckett of the Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Development of House Foreign Affairs Committee**

1. This afternoon, I accompanied Mr. Duckett, DDS&T, who briefed the above Subcommittee on the Soviet MRV program and answered a number of questions on related matters, particularly regarding verification in the event of a strategic arms limitation agreement with the USSR.
2. The session lasted from 1410 to 1700 hours and was attended by Subcommittee Chairman Clement J. Zablocki, and Representatives Donald M. Fraser (D., Minn.) and Jonathan Bingham (D., N.Y.). Mr. John Sullivan, of the Subcommittee staff, was also present. The discussion was conducted on a "secret-sensitive" level and no transcript was made.
3. Following his briefing on the Soviet MRV program, Mr. Duckett made the following points in response to questions by Subcommittee members:
  - a. While we believe the SS-9 is designed for use against hard targets, the community has never referred to it as a "first strike weapon." Under our definition, a true "first strike" capability would involve Soviet weapons systems not only capable of neutralizing our Minuteman force, but also our SAC and Polaris capabilities. In particular, we doubt the Soviets will have any effective capability against our Polaris submarine force in the near future, and hence we do not credit them with a first strike capability in the next few years.

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b. The Soviet expenditures on defense are comparable to the U.S. provided we do not include expenditures related to our Vietnam involvement. However, the ratio of the Soviet defense expenditures devoted to strategic weapons systems is a bit higher than ours, and the Soviet expenditures for strategic defense are significantly higher than those of the U.S.

c. If the Soviet MRV program is in fact intended to produce a MIRV capability, a number of additional tests are to be expected. 25X1D

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d. No one that we know of in the intelligence community, who has access to the relevant information, believes the Soviets now have a MIRV capability.

e. We have no solid evidence that the Soviets have changed their position regarding on-sight inspection but there is some speculation in this regard.

4. Those attending listened to Mr. Duckett's briefing attentively and their questions reflected an apparently serious and objective interest. They expressed appreciation and the Chairman remarked that Mr. Duckett had been most helpful in clarifying some matters that had caused them considerable concern.

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JOHN M. MAURY  
Legislative Counsel

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OLC/JMM:jmd:gs(1 August 1969)

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